Category: Singles

(Dig in; this is a long post. Located within includes commentary on the new ball, critiques of serve selection, and the “reason” CM lost the game).

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Every once in a while there’s a compelling enough match that I dig out my patented “Match Tracker” spreadsheet and spend a bit of time analyzing a game to find some hidden insights as to the result.

Given that we just witnessed a scintillating match between the then #1 Daniel De La Rosa and the now newly ascended to #1 Conrrado Moscoso for the Longhorn Open Final, one with a back and forth 15-14 first game, I thought i’d take a dive and see what information we could glean.

The video, if you want to re-watch it, is here: https://www.facebook.com/racquetballtour/videos/697166515201347

The match tracker data for Game 1 is now uploaded to this Google xls:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1AgZM2XL_IE8iDr3cM19FwgPb_cmUHasP4PcOYszqNhs/

The first tab is a detailed accounting of all 54 rallies, while the second tab has the aggregated data that will be the basis of most of this analysis. The other tabs explain the serve and rally codes in use.

Lets dive in and get some interesting info:

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– Game 1 Length: 32mins, 36 seconds

This works out to around 36 seconds per rally. That’s about what I’ve seen with most of these other match tracking i’ve done, especially in tense, strategic games. Moscoso is a bit of a slower player, with a pedantic, deliberate serving motion, which adds some time. DLR isn’t exactly speedy himself, and had a ton of missed first serves in this game, which extended the time.

There were also two time-outs taken and two rather lengthy towel time-outs, so taking those delays out, you’re closer to a 29minute game and about 32 seconds per rally. Not bad.

– Rallies: there were 54 rallies exactly here: There were 29 points scored, 24 side-outs, and only one replay.

It was a rather clean game; just one replay, no avoidables, and that replay was a pretty soft one in this viewer’s opinion, coming on a play where Moscoso claimed a swing hinder but DLR looked exasperated that it was given.

– DLR won 27 of the rallies, Moscoso 26, and there was one replay. Not much between them in this game, as @Favio Soto repeatedly said while doing the finals broadcast with Tourney Director Soly Kor .

– Number of 1 shot rallies (aka Aces): 1.

– Number of 2 shot rallies: 16.

– Number of 3-shot rallies: 13

So more than 50% of the rallies were of the bang-bang-bang variety. This is what you’d expect with two skilled shot-makers.

– Average Number of Shots per rally: 2.74 not including the serve.

So, this is one of the points I wanted to get into. The Longhorn Open was the first event to use the new Gearbox ball, which we know is thicker and slower. Many have speculated about what impact this would have on the pro game. Would it slow down power players, would it drastically increase rallies? Would it lead to fewer aces? Would it lead to more aces?

First off, the court type and altitude makes a huge difference in the game, irrespective of the ball. Austin is just a few hundred feet above sea level, but featured concrete walls, which minimize the impact a bit of a slower ball. So that de-emphasizes a slower ball a bit for this event.

That being noted, here’s what we found in this data: an average of 2.74 shots per rally after the serve is roughly half a shot more per rally than the last time I did this analysis (the Kane-Andree Atlanta 11-10 game, which came in at 2.2 shots per rally), and a bit more than another, older game between two power players (the 2002 Kane-Cliff Halloween classic game that’s all over youtube): that one came in at 2.59 shots per rally.

What we really need to do is go back to the last time DLR-CM played (the Denver final in 2021) and do similar analysis. But even then, that match was at altitude and may not give us a neutral accounting either.

It is possible that the Gearbox ball resulted in about half an extra shot per rally, or one extra ball every other rally. It is also possible that we’re seeing the impact of a skilled defender like DLR who liberally used ceiling balls off of drive serves and rarely made an error during rallies, as compared to the playing style of Kane, which was basically to go for shots at every opportunity and resulted in a a ton of 2- and 3-shot rallies in that game.

At the end of the day, the Longhorn semis featured #1, #3, #4, and a #15 player who’s far better than #15 in the semis, so the players who were “supposed” to get to the semis basically got there. If the Gearbox ball supposedly favors the control player, then why didn’t we see the tour’s best control players (guys like Parrilla and Landa) do better? Landa was upset by Carter in the 16s and th en spent the rest of the weekend complaining about the ball on social media, while Parrilla ended up losing to another excellent control player in Mar. Perhaps the pre-eminent power player on tour right now is Moscoso; he made the final with relative ease.

More to come on this topic as we see how the tour goes forward with this ball, but that’s my thoughts for now.

Coincidentally, the longest rally of the game was just 9 shots; it occurred relatively early in the game and ended with a Moscoso forehand error.

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Number of dives: only 6. Given how much these two players dive, they really did not spend much time on the floor. that’s probably because they were both making too many un-gettable shots.

Number of rollouts: 13. This was the number of times I saw a shot that was irretrievable, no matter where the opponent was standing. 13 rollout winners out of 39 total winners. That’s actually somewhat low; we definitely saw a ton more passing shots and use of lines/angles in this game versus going-for-broke kill shots.

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Lets dive into some Serving stats. DLR first:

– 28 serves, just one 1 ace

– Only a 67% first serve in rate: he missed 9 of 28 first serves. That’s not very good.

– DLR drove serve 100% of the time; not one first serve lob.

– DLR hit 64% (18 of 28) drive serves to backhand, 35% (10 of 28) to the forehand. A decent 2-1 ratio, clearly meaning to try to keep CM on his toes and not do too much guessing backhand.

– When DLR drove to the backhand, he scored 10 of his 15 points. When DLR drove to the forehand … he scored just one point. 1 point out of 9 drives to the forehand. If I was DLR’s coach … i’d probably say, “stop drive serving his forehand: it isn’t working.”

– When DLR got his first serve in; 12 out of 19 points for 63% rate. When DLR missed his first serve, he scored on just 3 of 9 second serves for a 33% rate. Two lessons here: get your first serve in … and drive serve instead of lob.

Conclusions: DLR did not serve especially well in this game, but showed decent effectiveness when he did get the serve in. He got 4 points either from Aces or from service return errors and two more via classic 3-shot rallies (serve, return, kill). He should abandon the drive to the forehand against Conrrado, perhaps splitting his time 66% drive backhand and 33% hard Z to forehand. He did not try any other hard serves; no jams, no wrap-arounds, no real change of pace drives.

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Serve Analysis for Moscoso: Here’s Conrrado’s serving analysis:

– 26 serves, zero Aces.

A pause here. Zero aces from one of the biggest hitters in the game? Is this because of the ball, or is it because DLR is the most skilled player in the game at returning? A combination of both? Also notably, Moscoso did not foot fault one time in this game; this has long been a bugaboo for him, and he used to liberally FF over and over. Has he modified his serving mechanics to sacrifice power for a shorter stride and more control? Unknown.

– CM had a great 1st serve percentage: 23 of 26 serves in for an 88% success rate. That’s super impressive for a guy who hits as hard as he does; its reminiscent of the old one-serve power players like Cliff, Sudsy, Ellis.

– As did DLR, CM drove serve 100% of the time.

– CM hit 92% of his drives to DLR’s backhand (24 of 26). He hit just two drives down the line to DLR’s forehand. Both those forehand serves were over fast: one was a service return error for a point, one was a crushed pass kill for a side-out.

CM had very little variation in his first serves: he didn’t really hit anything resembling a jam the entire game. He hit one serve that looked like it was an attempt at a wrap around, but it more likely was a flown drive serve that hit the back wall a few feet up and probably was a mis-hit. No Z-serves. Perhaps this is why he got no aces: DLR never had to really guess where the serve was going. To me, the times CM did go to the forehand, he so badly telegraphed it that DLR could jump the serve.

– CM did so little serving to the forehand that there’s no value in breaking down FH vs BH drive serve stats.

– When CM got his first serve in, he got points about half the time. 12 of his points came on his 23 first serves in. Probably needs to be higher, and indicates that despite his high 1st serve percentage the serves were not as effective as he needed them to be.

– Interestingly he got points on 2 of his 3 lobs/second serves. And all three of these 2nd serve/lob attempts were 3-shot rallies: twice DLR left up a return and CM buried it, the third time CM went for the kill and missed.

Conclusions: CM needs to get more from his powerful service game. I’d suggest more variation, more jam serves and more z-balls as change of pace/alternative serves. Also, he had such good success with his lobs in small sample sizes, i wonder if its worth trying to lob DLR an entire game to see what happens.

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Rally stats. This is where the real reason the game was won/lost becomes evident.

DLR Rally ending breakdown: DLR had 17 rally winners:

– 9 forehands, 7 backhands. Very even spread

– 12 passing winners, 4 pinch/splat winners.

This is amazing to me, b/c DLR’s game is normally to pinch everything he can. Perhaps against this player, who is one of the better divers in the sport, he chose to work the lines more than to go for broke with lower percentage shots. This breakdown does NOT seem to support the slower ball; a slower ball is easier to pinch.

– Just 4 errors the entire game. Three of the errors were on the service return, meaning DLR made just one error during the run of play for the entire game.

– DLR had a 17/4 Winner/Error ratio for the game, that’s 6.25 winners per error. Awesome.

CM Rally ending breakdown: CM had 22 winners, more than DLR.

– 9 forehands, 13 backhands. CM really has an amazing backhand.

– 9 passing winners, 13 pinch/splat winners. This is the Moscoso we know, the most opportunistic shooter in the game right now.

– 10 errors. Moscoso made 10 rally ending errors in the game. Despite all his winners, this was the reason he lost. He had game point on his forehand and missed. Most of his winners were on the backhand, and most of his errors were on the backhand too (7 of the 10).

– CM had a 22/10 Winner/Error ratio. So just 2.2 winners per error as compared to DLR’s ratio, which was 3 times as high.

Conclusions based on the rally stats: DLR was more in control and played a very error-free game, which made the difference in the end. CM plays kind of like Serena Williams: he makes a ton of errors, but he also makes a ton of winners. He drives play and dictates the action. Turn more of those errors into winners and suddenly he’s Kane Waselenchuk.

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That’s my deep dive. Honestly, i’m surprised after seeing these stats that it was 15-14. I would have thought it would have been more in DLR’s favor. But the shot-making ability of CM made the difference.

Hope you enjoyed reading this far!

With his finals result at the 2023 Longhorn Open, @Conrrado Moscoso has officially ascended to the #1 spot on tour. This is obviously the first time Moscoso has ascended to #1 ranking on tour, and it represents the first time a player from outside the “Big 3” countries USA/Canada/Mexico has risen this far. Moscoso achieved a #1 tournament seed in October 2022 (when DLR skipped the Pleasanton event and Moscoso had risen to #2 temporarily), but now is the top dog.

I’ve seen more than a few comments from KRG and elsewhere online questioning how he could be #1 over Daniel De La Rosa when they met in the Longhorn final and Daniel beat Conrrado heads-up. These comments are misguided and don’t seem to exhibit an understanding of a rolling ranking system.

Why did Conrrado leapfrog Daniel for #1 despite losing the final to him on Sunday?

The answer is simple: the IRT rankings are not based on a “who beat who yesterday” concept, Its based on a rolling calendar of results. Just like Squash, or Tennis, and most any other individual pro sport with a “tour,” the reigning #1 is determined based on the totality of their results over a longer period of time than one specific match.

Right now, the IRT’s ranking system includes every player’s past 11 Tier1/Grand Slam tournaments. In the wake of Covid, the IRT pivoted from a conventional rolling 365-day calendar (which had been in place since the 1981-82 season) to include tournaments that may fall outside that range. The choice of exactly 11 tournaments was specific; that was roughly the average number of events that the tour was hosting before Covid struck, so it made sense to not penalize players who chose to not play events and expand the ranking calendar to include older events.

I maintain a “Rolling 2-year IRT Worksheet” that helps illustrate the points. I use this spreadsheet to write up my “predicted impacts to rankings” in all my recap posts.

I’ve uploaded the latest copy of it here:

When the Longhorn Open finished, the rankings recalculation would take the Longhorn Results and “expire” the 12th oldest tournament. That expiring tournament turned out to be the 2021 US Open, won by Daniel. So, Daniel was set to “lose” 600 points for winning that grand slam, and to replace those points with whatever points he earned in Austin. That turned out to be 400 points for winning. So Take Daniel’s pre-Austin ranking points total (2933), subtract 600, add 400, and you get 2733.

Now lets do the same arithmetic for Connrado: heading into Austin he had 2652 points. His 2021 US Open was disappointing: he lost to Carlos Keller in the 16s, meaning he only earned 135 points there. So take 2652, subtract 135, add in his points for making the Austin final (300), and you get 2817.

2817 is more than 2733 … so that’s why Moscoso is now #1.

(Note: i’m excluding fractions of points earned for specific game wins/losses for simplicity of the post; in reality DLR has exactly 2,733.44 points, and Moscoso has exactly 2817.51 points).

Here’s the next interesting point: NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS in the next IRT event (the Lewis Drug Pro-Am on Jan 22nd), Conrrado will stay #1. Why? Because he did not play the 2021 Arizona event (which will expire next), and thus has no points to “defend.” He can do nothing but improve and increase his lead at the top of the tour. It won’t be until the Suivant Consulting GS in mid February where we might see some changes … that tournament will expire Sarasota from Nov 2021, won by Conrrado, so he’ll have 400 points to defend. But he’ll also have a Grand Slam to replace those points, and if he gets anywhere close to the back end of the tournament he’ll maintain the lead again.

At some point, the IRT probably will pivot back to a conventional 365-year calendar. We’re out of Covid, we’re back to a regular cadence of events (there’s going to be 7 events by the end of April, a very healthy slate, and then we’ll have Denver in the summer and the regular events in the fall, meaning we will have plenty of events in the calendar year on which to base events). DLR may very well trail Conrrado for months … but he will “catch up” greatly come this fall. He missed three IRT events between September and December 2022, meaning he’ll drastically catch-up later this year. It should make for an exciting finish to the 2023 season.

But in the meantime, I hope this explains the reasoning and provides insight to the machinations of the rankings.

Welcome to Part 4 of our season recap: a discussion of some notable players ranked 21 and above this year.

Part 1: reference links to various year-end resources of note.

Part 2: the top 10

Part 3: 11-20

Part 4: notables ranked 21st and above (this post)

Thanks to the lack of funds available in our sport, more and more we’re seeing quite talented players who, if everyone was touring full time, might very well be ranked higher. These are the players nobody wants to see in the qualifiers when they do show up, and they’re the kind of “weekend warriors” who inspire the rest of us … we’re all “weekend warriors” at heart.

Here’s a run through some notable players ranked outside the top 20, with some comments and in some cases predictions on 2023.

– #21 Erick Trujillo ; might as well start with the elephant in the room. Trujillo has exploded onto the IRT scene, making a couple of rounds of 16 and even one quarter final. He made the finals of both Mexico u21 and World u21 (losing to Jose Ramos and Diego Garcia respectively). He’s already got solid wins on his resume (Mar, Franco, Garay) and will continue to improve. I see him moving into the teens with ease, and possibly higher, as he improves.

– #24: Jaime Martel played more events in 2022 than he had in the last three seasons combined, and it showed. He made the main draw three times, got to a quarter final, got some really solid wins. He topped Patata, Murray, and Franco in the last two events before a quarters loss to Jake in Pleasanton (one where he beat the big man 15-2 in the first game).

If he continues to play full time, look for him to push for the top 20.

– #27 Jordy Alonso has gotten some really impressive wins this past season, and if he can string together more of a full time tour schedule I can see him (along with Martell) pushing for the top 20 on tour.

– #28 Sam Bredenbeck was really, really zinging it at Worlds, playing the left side in doubles. He’s stepped up his game in terms of power, is training with some great players in Minnesota, and it’d be great to see him playing week in-week out to get his ranking up.

#31 Diego Garcia could be the best player not playing the tour full time. Here’s a quick list of players he beat in 2022 (internationally or professionally): Mercado, Collins, Franco, Mar, Carson, Trujillo twice, and Ramos to win World 21U. That’s quite a slate of wins. We hadn’t seen him domestically since Oct 2019 as he switched countries from Bolivia to Argentina.

I wonder if he can start getting support to travel and tour, because if so watch out, he could be pushing for the top 10.

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#36 Bobby Horn is still heavily involved in the sport, working with the Manillas on their online training/coaching initiative and working hard to host programming at his home club in Pleasanton. When he does play, he’s still dangerous.

#46 @Cole Sendry , USA 16U competitor, played his first few IRT events this year and got some experience.

#53 Maurice Miller took a big step back from touring but still is a dangerous opponent when he shows.

#83 @Jordan Barth is the highest ranked player (by USAR rankings) who doesn’t tour regularly. he’s #28 at USAR and would be an interesting addition to the tour.

#98 Cliff Swain ; his 35th year in the rankings.

#99 Coby Iwaasa , long-time #2 in Canada and who regularly gets strong international wins. Rarely appears on the IRT. Another guy who would be interesting to see play.

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A shout-out to the Guatemalans, who seem to play nearly every IRT event. Bravo, its always awesome to see the likes of @JuJuan Salvatiera , Christian Wer, @Javier martinez , Edwin Galicia , and @Geovani Mendoza at these events.

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That’s it for our 2022 season retrospective. We have the Longhorn Open this coming weekend, so look for our preview soon.

Welcome to Part 3 of our season recap: a discussion of the guys who finished 11-20th this year.

Part 1: reference links to various year-end resources of note.

Part 2: the top 10

Part 3: 11-20 (This post)

Part 4: notables ranked 21st and above

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“Finishing in the top 10” is a metric I use a lot, but i’m not sure it means a ton to players. I get the sense that pro players care first and foremost about season-ending #1s, then tourney wins, then just want to earn as much money as possible (which normally means they want to get to at least the semis of an event to make “decent” money for the weekend. Top 8 is the place where you really want to be; that guarantees you a round of 16 spot and prize money each weekend; if you’re in 9th or 10th then you’re playing one extra match just to get there each weekend. But, its easy to divide analysis by the “top10” so that’s what we do.

Fyi: Rocky Carson is the Men’s all-time leader in “top 10s” for a season with 23.

Second place is Cliff Swain , who had 20 top-10 seasons plus another 15 seasons with results; see my top 10 matrix report here for more fun info: https://rball.pro/tbz).

That all being said, the guys who are just outside the top 10 are always interesting to me. Generally are guys who fall into one of three distinct categories:

– Former top 10 guys on their way down

– Up and coming full-time players who are trying to grind their way into the top 10

– Part time players who are better than their ranking but who can’t commit full time to the tour.

Looking at the guys who finished 11-20th this season (https://rball.pro/t8a ), i’d probably classify them as follows:

– On the way out: Franco, Beltran

– Grinders: Manilla, Acuna, Carter

– Wish they could play more: Montoya, Keller, Fernandez, Garay, Mar

We’ll use these story-lines throughout this writeup.

Lets talk about the guys who finished 11th-20th this year and give some projections on where they may end up next season.

– #11: Rodrigo Montoya played 7 of the 9 events this year, made two finals and saw his ranking jump from #17 last year to just outside of the top 10 this year. I’ve already kind of buried the lede with my last post in where I think Montoya ends up next year.

For me, Montoya’s talent has always been evident. He has two major IRF titles (2018 Worlds and then 2019 Pan Am Games Gold). He won 4 titles and made another 4 finals on the old WRT before it went defunct. But he’s never been able to give the IRT a full-time go, and has been balancing school and touring for years (he’s an Aerospace Engineer and holds an MBA and has spent most of the past few years in grad school).

This year in 2022, in addition to his pro successes, he made the back ends of multiple international events (finals of Mexican Nationals, finals of the World Games, semis of PARC, and semis of Worlds). This workload seemed to take its toll; he lost his final 2022 match 1,4 and put up very little resistance.

Prediction for 2023? Well, if he plays a full slate of events, he’s a top-4 talent in the world and should finish top 4. But if he’s hurt or continues to miss events here and there, he’ll be stuck in that 10-16 range where he’s been for years.

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#12: Adam Manilla improved from #14 last year to #12 this year. In 8 events played, he made 4 quarters and lost in the 16s four times. To get to his four quarters, he had wins over top players Landa, Portillo, Mercado, and Keller; not a bad slate of wins. His 16s losses were to Landa, Rocky, Rocky, and Carter (only the last one really being a “bad” loss). He’s clearly improving as a player, made the semis of Nationals (again losing to Rocky), and when he did lose he played tough, often losing games 15-11/15-12 against top4 guys.

He’s on a roll and I see him continuing to incrementally improve on his ranking. I can see him right on the cusp of the top 10 at the end of this coming season, maybe even higher if we see some possible machinations at the back half of the top 10 (like if Kane retires and opens up a top 10 spot).

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#13 Andres Acuña improved on his 2021 ranking of #16 mostly on the back of a strong run in Sarasota, where he had a career best showing of making the semis (beating Landa and getting a walkover against Lalo to get there). Otherwise he remains stuck at the round of 16 gate, losing in the 16s in 6 of the 8 tournaments he entered.

He has managed to get out of the always-dangerous 16/17 seed range, which gives a very tough round of 32 match only to head into the #1 seed (almost always a loss), and now can feed into players he has a better chance of beating to advance into the quarters, but the time is now. He cannot continue to lose in the 16s and have a shot at the top10.

Interestingly, he showed more internationally than he did on the pro circuit, making the final of PARC (losing to Moscoso), winning the World Games (topping Montoya in the final), and making the semis of Worlds (losing to Rocky). On the pro tour his best win all season was probably Mar in Chicago or Landa in Sarasota, and he took a “bad” loss against Zelada in Maryland.

For 2023, I see him doing more of the same; mostly round of 16 losses, an occasional quarter, an occasional upset with a bad round of 32 matchup. But he’s absolutely committed to the tour full time and won’t miss a tourney. That says 12-13 range for me.

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#14 Carlos Keller sees his ranking drop slightly from its #12 spot in 2021, but this lofty ranking is built on a house of cards. He missed 6 of the 9 events in 2022 after essentially touring full time the previous two seasons, and his #14 ranking is buttressed by the fact that it still includes the Grand Slam points of his finals run in the 2021 US Open.

When those points expire, his ranking will plummet out of the top 20 and unless he plans on re-committing to touring full time he’ll stay in the 20s. In the 17 events he has played in the last 3 seasons now, he’s lost in the 16s or earlier in 14 of them. This is not a winning financial strategy and is likely why he’s stepped back.

Expect his ranking to be in the mid 20s going forward as he plays just a couple events a year.

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#15: @Sebastian Franco has seen his former top 10 ranking slip to #13 last year and #15 this year. In 7 events played this year, he lost in the 32s 5 times.

Life seems to have caught up to Franco, as family commitments and work requirements seem to be conspiring against him as a touring pro. Losing in the 32s is not a winning financial strategy, and I’d guess we’ll be seeing less and less of him going forward. He’s good enough to keep making a quarterfinal here and there, so I’ll predict he hangs around the top 20.

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#16: Thomas Carter improved from #18 last season and played well this year. He got solid wins in the 32s all year and capped the season with a great win over fellow lefty Manilla in Portland. Eight tourneys played, five times he made the 16s. That’s definitely a recipe for sticking in the top 16.

For 2023 I expect more of the same, with him getting an occasional upset win or upset loss, and hanging right at this same range 15-16.

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#17: Sebastian Fernandez marginally improved on his 2021 finish of #19. For the better part of two seasons he’s been absolutely “stuck” at the 16/17 seed in events, and has not advanced past the 16s in that time.

In his last 10 Pro events, here’s who took him out: Martell, Montoya, Landa, DLR, Montoya, DLR, DLR, DLR, Landa. That takes you all the way back to the 2021 US Open. Thats … well that’s a tough slate of round of 16 or round of 32 opponents. Patata is challenged just to get a decent shot at advancing. And you can kind of see it in his play; after playing most of the first half of the tour, he played just the US Open and Pleasanton to end it, perhaps going back into partial touring as he said he would a couple of years ago.

2023 prediction: he hangs around at this same gate, maybe gets a couple of wins, and marginally improves on his ranking.

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#18: Eduardo Garay dropped from #15 last year to #18 this year and seems to be struggling for consistency on tour. In 6 events he was beaten in the 32s three times, the rest in the 16s.

His international career remains in limbo; after seemingly converting to Colombia that federation has collapsed and he hasn’t played internationally in years. He’s working for Francisco Fajardo and Team Zurek, which is great, but (like Franco) it seems to be having a negative effect on his playing career.

For 2023, I predict he continues to be part time and hangs around the 19-20 range.

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#19 @Javier Mar got some statement wins this year, but continues to play the tour essentially part time. It is hard to predict that he makes a huge push when he seems to play just half the events (a situation that guarantees he’s always qualifying and guarantees he gets random round of 32 matches that are coin flips).

For 2023 I’m guessing he improves on his ranking slightly, but won’t get much about the 16-17 range unless he commits to playing full time.

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#20 @Alvaro Beltran saw his ranking plummet from #11 to #20, partly because he frankly was just done playing singles and partly because of the elbow injury he suffered in Las Vegas that took him out of the last couple of events. I would be surprised to see him playing serious singles going forward, and may be either retiring, just pivoting to doubles, or pivoting to select events that are drive-able as he transitions into a Gearbox ambassador role.

Expect his singles ranking to slowly disappear as he moves towards retirement in 2023.

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Predicted 11-20 rankings for 2023 (and other rankings for players mentioned here):

4. Rodrigo Montoya

11. Adam Manilla

12. Andres Acuna

13. Mario Mercado

14. Sebastian Fernandez

15. Thomas Carter

16. Javier Mar

17. Erick Trujillo (see next post)

18. Eduardo Garay

19. Sebastian Franco

20. Jordy Alonso (see next post)

Outside top 20: Keller, Beltran